00343

1975/04/16

SECRET

ONI-CS-52,06-75
16 APRIL 1975

611

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY



Capability Studies of the People's Republic of China Naval Forces

PREPARED BY
NAVY FIELD OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
NAVY FIELD OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

SERIAL ONI-CS-52-6-75

DATE 16 April 1975

LETTER OF PROMULGATION

1. This Special Intelligence Study (SIS) is a Department of Defense intelligence product prepared by the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office. This Study deals with intelligence relative to the growing threat posed by potentially hostile naval forces and as such is intended for fleet-wide distribution.

2. THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, U.S. CODE TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793, 794, AND 798. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

3. No one may disseminate the information reported in this publication or communicate it to any person other than one officially indoctrinated and authorized to receive such information. Persons authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every precaution to avoid compromising the source, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of authorized persons who need the information in order to discharge their duties.

4. No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source.

5. This material shall not be carried in aircraft for use therein..

J.L. BUTTS
CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY
Officer in Charge

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 37 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Page		Page		Page	
i	ORIGINAL	I-10	ORIGINAL	II-3	ORIGINAL
ii	ORIGINAL	I-11	ORIGINAL	II-4	ORIGINAL
iii	ORIGINAL	I-12	ORIGINAL	II-5	ORIGINAL
I-1	ORIGINAL	I-13	ORIGINAL	II-6	ORIGINAL
I-2	ORIGINAL	I-14	ORIGINAL	II-7	ORIGINAL
I-3	ORIGINAL	I-15	ORIGINAL	II-8	ORIGINAL
I-4	ORIGINAL	I-16	ORIGINAL	II-9	ORIGINAL
I-5	ORIGINAL	I-17	ORIGINAL	II-10	ORIGINAL
I-6	ORIGINAL	I-18	ORIGINAL	D-1	ORIGINAL
I-7	ORIGINAL	I-19	ORIGINAL	D-2	ORIGINAL
I-8	ORIGINAL	II-1	ORIGINAL	D-3	ORIGINAL
I-9	ORIGINAL	II-2	ORIGINAL	D-4	ORIGINAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

Record of Corrections

Identification	Date Entered	Signature

SECRET

CAPABILITY STUDIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NAVAL FORCES (U)

ABSTRACTS

VOLUME I

THE PERSONNEL LIFT CAPABILITY OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (U)

(U) The amphibious lift capability of the People's Republic of China is considered under three different scenarios - an amphibious assault in the Spratly Island area, against Taiwan and against South Korea. The study considers only the lift capability of the amphibious force vessels (to the exclusion of trawlers, junks, etc.) and computes this capability in terms of personnel.

VOLUME II

THE PRC FUEL OIL REPLENISHMENT CAPABILITY IN THE SPRATLY ISLAND AREA OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (U)

(U) Based upon the amount of fuel oil which could be transported to the Spratly Island area by Chinese small transport oilers (AOTLs), this study describes one possible mix of warships and amphibious vessels which could participate in an amphibious assault in the Spratly Island area of the South China Sea.

(U) The cut-off date for information used in the preparation of these studies is 15 January 1975.

((Descriptors: Amphibious Warfare, China, KIANGNAN Class, OSA Class, Refueling, Replenishment, South China Sea, South Korea, Taiwan, Spratly Islands, OOB, Capabilities, LSM, LST, South Sea Fleet, North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, Tanker, LUTA Class, GORDYY Class, RIGA Class, KIANGTUNG Class))

UNCLASSIFIED

VOLUME I

THE PERSONNEL LIFT CAPABILITY OF OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

CAPABILITY STUDIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NAVAL FORCES (U)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

THE PERSONNEL LIFT CAPABILITY OF OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (U)

LIST OF FIGURES

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

VOLUME I (Cont'd)

Page

LIST OF TABLES

SECRET

VOLUME I

THE PERSONNEL LIFT CAPABILITY OF
OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (U)

[redacted]

I. INTRODUCTION

(U)(S) Amphibious warfare ships and craft in the People's Republic of China (PRC) Navy are subordinate to the Main Surface Force in the North Sea Fleet, to the Auxiliary Force in the South Sea Fleet, and to a separate Landing Force in the East Sea Fleet. The term "Amphibious Force," as used in this study, includes all these amphibious warfare ships and craft irrespective of current fleet and force subordination.

(U) In considering the amphibious lift capability of the Amphibious Force of the PRC, two important considerations must be kept in mind. First, the PRC would probably not be the least bit reluctant to employ many vessels not subordinate to the Amphibious Force, such as trawlers, light cargo ships, etc., for an amphibious invasion if the Amphibious Force is considered to be inadequate for a given operation. Secondly, some of the vessels identified as part of the Amphibious Force have been modified by the PRC to perform a dual or alternate function not necessarily related to amphibious operations. No attempt has been made in this study to evaluate either these modifications as they affect the PRC amphibious lift capability or the possibility that non-Amphibious Force vessels would be employed during the scenarios discussed.

(U)(S) Because of the limited number of amphibious vehicles available to the PRC and China's natural inclination to think in terms of manpower as its greatest strength, this study evaluates the amphibious lift capability of the PRC primarily in terms of its personnel-carrying capability.

(U)(S) The potential sites for a PRC amphibious invasion are limited in this study to the islands of the South China Sea (possible), Taiwan (unlikely), and South Korea (remote). All of these sites are within relative geographical proximity to mainland China; therefore, only "short range" amphibious assault scenarios are considered. The Spratly Islands

have been selected as the southernmost landing site and South Korea as the easternmost site.

(U)(S) The range capability of the assault units has been computed from the various Naval Fleet Headquarters vice the homeport of each vessel: Ch'ing Tao in the North Sea Fleet (NSF), Shanghai in the East Sea Fleet (ESF), and Chan Chiang in the South Sea Fleet (SSF) (see Figure 1).

(U)(S) The approximate minimum distance from each of the fleet headquarters to each of the potential assault areas is presented in Table 1. In the case of the Spratly Island group the distances were measured to the southernmost island, Spratly Island itself.

TABLE 1 (S)(U)

DISTANCES FROM FLEET HEADQUARTERS TO THE ASSAULT AREA

	Spratly Islands	Taiwan	South Korea
Ch'ing Tao (NSF)	2,000 nm	700 nm	300 nm
Shanghai (ESF)	1,500 nm	375 nm	350 nm
Chan Chiang (SSF)	800 nm	570 nm	1,300 nm



Figure 1

ONI-CS-52-6-75

II. AMPHIBIOUS OOB AND POTENTIAL LIFT CAPABILITY

(U)(S) The PRC Amphibious Force vessel order-of-battle (OOB) by fleet subordination and the vessel characteristics which are critical to amphibious lift capability are presented in Table 2. In estimating the troop carrying capability of vessels originally designed to transport heavy assault equipment, e.g., a tank landing ship (LST), a substitution ratio of one man per 750 pounds of heavy equipment has been used. This number was derived from the officially listed cargo carrying capability of the US LSIL Class Infantry Landing Ship, "200 troops or 75 tons of cargo," and it is reasonable that a man would account for the volume occupied by 750 pounds of heavy equipment. The estimated personnel-carrying capabilities of the vessels which have been calculated using the above relationship are listed in parentheses in Table 2. Such a substitution of personnel for equipment is only valid for relatively short range transits because it does not consider berthing, messing and other required personnel facilities. This limitation will be discussed separately under each scenario. The relative sizes of PRC amphibious vessels are depicted in Figure 2.

TABLE 2 (S)(U)

AMPHIBIOUS VESSEL ORDER-OF-BATTLE AND CHARACTERISTICS

TYPE/ CLASS	SPEED/RANGE (Maximum & Economical)	CARGO	ORDER-OF-BATTLE NSF	ESF	SSF
Tank Landing Ships (LST)					
U.S. LST-1 Class	10.8 kts/19,800 nm 8 kts/38,500 nm	446 tons plus 137 troops (1,329 troops)	7	6	2
Medium Landing Ships (LSM)					
U.S. LSM-1 Class	12.8 kts/3,800 nm 6.7 kts/8,000 nm	147 tons plus 50 troops (442 troops)	3	8	4
YULING Class	12 kts/3,800 nm 7 kts/8,000 nm	700 tons (1,866 troops)	1	0	0
Infantry Landing Ships (LSIL)					
U.S. LSIL Class	12 kts/5,500 nm 9 kts/8,700 nm	200 troops or 75 tons	0	4	2

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

TYPE/ CLASS	SPEED/RANGE (Maximum & Economical)	CARGO	ORDER-OF-BATTLE NSF	ESF	SSF
Utility Landing Craft (LCU)					
U.K. LCT-4 Class	10 kts/500 nm 8 kts/1,100 nm	350 tons (1,033 troops)	0	0	1
U.K. LCT-3 Class	10.5 kts/1,900 nm 9 kts/2,700 nm	300 tons (800 troops)	0	1	1
U.S. LCT MK-5 Class	8 kts/650 nm 5 kts/1,200 nm	750 troops or 150 tons	0	0	4
U.S. LCT MK-6 Class	8 kts/650 nm 5 kts/1,200 nm	750 troops or 150 tons	1	8	0
Unidentified Type	(8 kts/500 nm) (5 kts/1,100 nm)	(750 troops)	1	0	6
Mechanized Landing Craft (LCM) (Only total LCM order-of-battle available)			110	190	150
YU CHIN & Soviet T-4 Class	5.6 kts/unknown	50 tons or 125 troops			
YUNNAN & YU CHAI Class	10 kts/600 nm	60 tons or 150 troops			
U.S. MK-6 Class	9.5 kts/130 nm	34 tons or 120 troops			

RELATIVE SIZES OF PRC AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS



0' LST-1 CLASS LST 328'



0' 203'

LSM-1 CLASS LSM

0' 114'

LCT MK-5 CLASS LCU

0' 62'

YU CHAI CLASS LCM

Figure 2

III. THE LOGISTIC PROBLEM OF FUEL OIL

(U) In each scenario two options will be presented. The first option assumes no provisions are made to refuel the amphibious ships, thus requiring a round trip capability based on an initial full fuel load. The second option assumes refueling vessels are available and that each amphibious vessel can be refueled prior to its return trip home. In this case an amphibious vessel could participate in the assault if it is capable of a one way transit to the area based on an initial full fuel load.

(U) (S) The refueling capability of the PRC Navy is limited to about 21 small transport oilers (AOTL), none of which has ever been noted conducting underway replenishment (UNREP) operations. Some of the vessels such as the US METTAWEE Class and LEI CHOU Class are not credited with an UNREP capability because of various limitations such as their poor station keeping characteristics in the open ocean, low freeboard when fully loaded, and limited speed capability. (The relative sizes of several classes of PRC AOTLs are depicted in Figure 3.) However, all the PRC AOTLs are capable of transferring fuel to other vessels from a moored or anchored condition; therefore, to avoid speculation concerning an UNREP capability which the PRC Navy has ostensibly decided not to exploit, it is assumed that refueling operations will only occur from stationary AOTLs which have moored or anchored in the vicinity of the assault area. The vulnerability of stationary vessels conducting refueling operations and the attendant requirement for air superiority,etc. are considered only slightly more limiting than during UNREP operations in which vessels are necessarily closely grouped and severely restricted in course, speed and maneuverability. The AOTL OOB and vessel characteristics pertinent to this study are presented in Table 3.

SECRET

RELATIVE SIZES OF PRC SMALL TRANSPORT OILERS



Figure 3

TABLE 3 (S) (U)

PRC TRANSPORT OILER CHARACTERISTICS AND ORDER-OF-BATTLE

CLASS	SPEED/ENDURANCE	LOGISTICS FUEL	LOGISTICS CARGO (LIQUID)	OOB
UK EBANOL Class	8 kts/1,200 nm	40 tons fuel oil	1,000 tons	1 SSF
Japanese 2 TM Class	8 kts/3,700 nm	240 tons diesel	3,700 tons	1 ESF
US METTAWEE Class	6 kts/2,100 nm	200 tons diesel	1,228 tons	2 ESF
FU CHOU Class	6 kts/2,000 nm	60 tons diesel	700 tons	5 NSF 6 ESF 4 SSF
KUANG CHOU Class	10 kts/1,200 nm	10 tons diesel	91 tons diesel 110 tons fuel oil	1 SSF
LEI CHOU Class	9 kts/1,800 nm	60 tons diesel	600 tons	1 NSF 1 SSF
FU CHI Class	6 kts/2,000 nm	40 tons diesel	800 tons	2 SSF

(U) The amount of POL which can be carried to the assault area by the transport oilers has been calculated based on the assumption that, if an AOTL has the capability of reaching the area with its normal fuel load, it can participate in the operation and refuel itself prior to returning to its homeport. In cases where such an internal refueling is required, the amount of POL carried by the vessel (liquid cargo) has been reduced proportionately, prior to calculating the total amount of POL available in the assault area.

(U)(S) Applying the above methodology to the figures in Table 1 (Distances to the Assault Areas) and Table 3 (Transport Oiler Characteristics and Order-of-Battle), it can be shown that:

1. 18,790 tons of POL can be made available in the Spratly Island scenario, with only the NSF subordinated LEI CHOU Class AOTL incapable of participating;

2. 20,656 tons of POL can be made available in the Taiwan scenario, with all AOTLs participating; and

3. 19,334 tons of POL can be made available during the South Korean scenario, with the U.K. EBANOL Class and the KUANG CHOU Class AOTLs unable to make the journey from the SSF.

(U) The replenishment capability represented by 19,000 tons of POL is more than sufficient to justify consideration of the option which involves refueling the amphibious vessels from AOTLs prior to their return transit from the assault area. A precise example of the replenishment capability represented by 19,000 tons of POL is presented in Volume II of this study.

SECRET

IV. THE AMPHIBIOUS LIFT CAPABILITY vs SPECIFIC TARGET AREAS

A. Scenario 1: A PRC Amphibious Assault in the Spratly Island Area

(U) (S) In the event of an amphibious assault in the Spratly Island area by the PRC, the amphibious vessels which could be employed are presented below in Table 4.

TABLE 4 (S)(U)

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT CAPABILITY TO THE SPRATLY ISLANDS

	Without Refueling	Approximate Transit Time Based Upon the Speed of Slowest Vessel	Additional Vessels If One Refueling Is Available
From NSF (2,000 nm)	7 LSTs 4 LSMs	8 days	(none)
From ESF (1,500 nm)	6 LSTs 8 LSMs 4 LSILs	6 days	1 LCU (6 days)
From SSF (800 nm)	2 LSTs 4 LSMs 2 LSILs 1 LCU	3 days	11 LCUs (7 days)

(U) (S) Applying the values for personnel-carrying capability presented in Table 2 to the participants listed in Table 4 reveals that the amphibious lift capability during an assault in the Spratly Islands, without refueling, is approximately 31,000 men. With fuel available for replenishment, an additional 9,300 men could participate in the assault, making a total assault force of 40,300 men.

(U) (S) The transit times of 8 and 6 days from the NSF and ESF, respectively, pose additional questions. Can combat ready troops be confined aboard a vessel such as an LST or LSM for 8 days with field rations for food, little or no space for activity and grossly inadequate personnel facilities, and still be fit to conduct an amphibious assault? The answer must first consider the high probability of a stop-over at a SSF port rather than a direct transit to the landing area, or that the combat personnel may all be embarked at a SSF port as well as the typically spartan living conditions of the PRC soldier. Secondly, an artificial restriction has been included in the transit times by assuming that the vessels from each fleet area would transit together and at the speed of the slowest vessel. It is expected that the vessels would transit in groups with similar engineering capabilities and thereby reduce the overall transit time. The transit times and attendant shipboard inconveniences are not considered restrictive to the PRC under this scenario.

(U) (S) To summarize the PRC amphibious lift capability in the Spratly Islands, if the 40,000 men which could be transported to the area by the amphibious assault vessels all went ashore, they would populate the islands to a density in excess of 66,000 Chinese per square mile.

B. Scenario 2: A PRC Amphibious Assault on Taiwan

(U)(S) In support of an amphibious assault on Taiwan and disregarding the likelihood of replenishment stops en route, the following forces could be employed.

TABLE 5 (S)(U)

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT CAPABILITY TO TAIWAN

	Without Refueling	Approximate Transit Time Based Upon the Speed of Slowest Vessel	Additional Vessels If One Refueling Is Available
From NSF (700 nm)	7 LSTs 4 LSMs	3 days	2 LCUs (4 days)
From ESF (375 nm)	6 LSTs 8 LSMs 4 LSILs 9 LCUs	3 days	A significant number of the 190 LCMs. (3 days)
From SSF (570 nm)	2 LSTs 4 LSMs 2 LSILs 6 LCUs	5 days	6 LCUs (4 days)

(U)(S) The total personnel lift capability in this scenario without refueling is identical to that of the first scenario, with the addition of 9 LCUs from the ESF and 6 from the SSF, and is approximately 41,200 men. With the inclusion of a replenishment, an additional 8 LCUs could transport 6,000 men, and the ESF LCMs could transport approximately 18,000 men for a total amphibious lift capability of 65,000 men. The transit times in this scenario are not considered a restriction with regard to crew habitability aboard the vessels.

C. Scenario 3: A PRC Amphibious Assault on South Korea

(U) (S) This scenario also disregards the possibility of replenishment stops en route (especially restrictive with respect to SSF vessels) and concludes that in support of an amphibious assault on South Korea the following forces could be employed:

TABLE 6 (S)(U)

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT CAPABILITY TO SOUTH KOREA

	Without Refueling	Approximate Transit Time Based Upon the Speed of Slowest Vessel	Additional Vessels If One Refueling Is Available
From NSF (300 nm)	7 LSTs 4 LSMs 2 LCUs 73 LCMs (est)	2 days	None
From ESF (350 nm)	6 LSTs 8 LSMs 4 LSILs 9 LCUs 125 LCMs (est)	2 days	None
From SSF (1,300 nm)	2 LSTs 4 LSMs 2 LSILs 1 LCU	6 days	None

(U) (S) In this scenario the amphibious lift capability of the PRC is unaffected by the availability of AOTLs and totals 64,500 men.

(U) (S) For reasons similar to those discussed in the first scenario, the 6-day transit time for SSF amphibious vessels is not considered restrictive.

V. THE AVAILABILITY OF PERSONNEL

(U)(S) The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is capable of providing the personnel for each scenario. The maximum number of troops required in any scenario is less than 66,000, while the number of PLA forces stationed within each of those military regions, which include a Naval Fleet Headquarters, is in excess of 200,000 men.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(U)(S) There have been occasional reports of amphibious training exercises in China, indicating at least a basic awareness of the problems involved in an amphibious assault. The professionalism and competence of the Chinese personnel who made the amphibious landings in the Paracel Islands during January 1974 were outstanding and, if used as a measure, indicate that the PRC has an effective amphibious landing force.

(U)(S) The ability of the PRC Navy's Amphibious Force to transport PLA troops to an assault area is considerable. If one also considers the large number of PRC vessels capable of transporting personnel but not technically "amphibious vehicles" and therefore not included in this analysis, (merchant ships, trawlers, junks, etc.) and in light of the 3,000,000 men in the PLA, the PRC amphibious assault capability over relatively short distances is very signficiant.

(U)(S) In summary, the strength of number of which the PRC is feared as a land power can easily be extended to include short range amphibious assault operations, and this overwhelming numerical strength will probably overcome any lack of technical expertise during such an operation. The amphibious assault capability of the PRC appears to satisfy its current needs and if called upon to perform would indeed represent a potent force.

SECRET

CAPABILITY STUDIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NAVAL FORCES (U)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME II

THE PRC FUEL OIL REPLENISHMENT CAPABILITY IN THE SPRATLY ISLAND AREA OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (U)

LIST OF TABLES

VOLUME II

THE PRC FUEL OIL REPLENISHMENT CAPABILITY IN THE SPRATLY ISLAND AREA OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (U)

I. INTRODUCTION

(U) (Ø) As shown in Section III of the first volume of this study, 18,790 tons of POL can be made available for replenishment in the Spratly Island area of the South China Sea by Chinese AOTLs.

(U) (Ø) The underway replenishment capability of the AOTLs will again be avoided, and it will be assumed that all replenishment occurs from stationary AOTLs which are either moored or anchored in the vicinity of Spratly Island.

(U) (Ø) The "replenishment capability" of the PRC is presented in terms of the warships which could be provided with sufficient replenishment fuel to permit 3,000 miles of operations in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands, exclusive of the transit mileage to and from the Islands. It is assumed that all warships are homeported at their respective fleet headquarters for the purpose of computing transit distances to the Spratly Islands. The distance from each of the fleet headquarters to Spratly Island - the southernmost and therefore the most distant of the Spratly Island group - is as follows:

a.	From Ch'ing Tao (NSF Headquarters)	2,000 nm
b.	From Shanghai (ESF Headquarters)	1,500 nm
c.	From Chan Chiang (SSF Headquarters)	800 nm

II. WARSHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND ORDER-OF-BATTLE

(U) (S) The fuel capacity, endurance capability at economical speed, and OOB of the PRC naval warships which might participate in an operation in the Spratly Island area of the South China Sea are listed in Table 1. Since all replenishment is assumed to occur in the vicinity of Spratly Island and since no provisions have been made for vessels to stop at ports en route (for example, a NSF unit refueling at Hainan Island), vessels which are incapable of transiting to Spratly Island from their respective fleet headquarters have been omitted from the OOB presented in Table 1. Worthy of note is the fact that the economical range of a SHANGHAI-II Class PGM is only 725 nm, thus making it incapable of participating in any of the scenarios.

TABLE 1 (S)(U)

WARSHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND ORDER-OF-BATTLE

Type/Class	Fuel Capability/Endurance	Order-of-Battle NSF	ESF	SSF
Destroyer Types				
LUTA (DDGS)	800 tons/4,600 nm	2	0	2
GORDYY (DDGS)	400 tons/2,640 nm	4	0	0
RIGA (DEGS)	230 tons/2,450 nm	0	4	0
KIANGTUNG (DEG)	300 tons/4,500 nm	0	1	0
KIANGNAN (DE)	230 tons/3,000 nm	0	1	4
Motor Gunboats (PGM)				
SWATOW	10 tons/900 nm	0	0	21
Patrol Escorts (PF)				
KAIBOKAN, UKURU, ETOROFU & FLOWER	240 tons (max)/4,500 nm (min)	2	6	1
CASTLE	480 tons/9,100 nm	0	1	0
HASHIDATE	170 tons/3,460 nm	0	1	0
Fleet Minesweepers (MSF)				
T-43	61 tons/3,200 nm	7	8	8
Large Submarine Chasers (PC)				
HAINAN	25 tons/2,000 nm	5	4	8
KRONSHTADT	30 tons/1,400 nm	0	0	6

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Type/Class	Fuel Capability/Endurance	Order-of-Battle NSF	ESF	SSF
Large Guided Missile Patrol Boats (PTFG)				
OSA	40 tons/1,500 nm	0	24	10
Submarines (SS)				
WHISKEY	118 tons/2,400 nm	13	8	0
ROMEO	120 tons/2,400 nm	11	9	14

III. PRC WARSHIP SUPPORT CAPABILITY IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS

(U) In deciding which warships would be deployed to the Spratly Islands during a naval/amphibious operation, assume at least one vessel of each type capable of participating in the operation will be deployed and that the deployment sequence will minimize the transit distance. For example, if the same type vessel is available for deployment from each fleet area, those from the SSF will be deployed first followed by those from the ESF and finally those from the NSF.

(U)(S) In the amphibious assault scenario, the 18,790 tons of POL which can be transported to the Spratly Islands must be reduced by the amount required by the amphibious vessels prior to developing an allocation plan among combatants. In Volume I of this study, it was noted that the 12 utility landing craft (LCUs) would require refueling prior to returning to home port. All 12 of these vessels could be refueled with less than 290 tons, leaving at least 18,500 tons of POL for warship replenishment and support of the landing parties.

(U)(S) Based on the requirement for the warships to complete the round trip transit to Spratly Island and 3,000 nm of operations in the vicinity of the island, the POL replenish capability of the Chinese AOTLs could support:

5 guided missile destroyers,

5 guided missile destroyer escorts,

5 destroyer escorts,

15 motor gunboats,

10 patrol escorts,

10 fleet minesweepers,

15 large submarine chasers,

20 large guided missile patrol boats,

and 20 submarines

and still have about 6,000 tons of POL available for support of amphibious forces ashore. The unit availability and fuel requirements of such an armada are presented in Table 2.

~~SECRET~~

TABLE 2 (S/NU)

PRC ARMADA IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS

Vessel	No.	Fleet Origination	Fuel Required For Return Transit	Fuel Required to Allow 3,000 nm Steaming in Area
Destroyer Types				
LUTA (DDGS)	2	SSF	0	0
LUTA (DDGS)	1	NSF	0	550 tons
GORDYY (DDGS)	2	NSF	800 tons	950 tons
KIANGNAN (DE)	4	SSF	0	600 tons
KIANGNAN (DE)	1	ESF	20 tons	275 tons
KIANGTUNG (DEG)	1	ESF	0	275 tons
RIGA (DEGS)	4	ESF	0	1,025 tons
Motor Gunboats				
SWATOW (PGM)	15	SSF	150 tons	500 tons
Patrol Escorts				
ETOROFU (PF)	1	SSF	0	10 tons
KAIBOKAN (PF)	1	NSF	0	175 tons
(Various classes)	8	ESF	0	1,300 tons
Fleet Minesweepers				
T-43 (MSF)	8	SSF	0	225 tons
T-43 (MSF)	2	ESF	0	125 tons

SECRET

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

Vessel	No.	Fleet Origination	Fuel Required For Return Transit	Fuel Required to Allow 3,000 nm Steaming in Area
Large Submarine Chasers				
KRONSHTADT (PC)	6	SSF	30 tons	400 tons
HAINAN (PC)	8	SSF	0	200 tons
HAINAN (PC)	1	ESF	15 tons	50 tons
Large Guided Missile Patrol Boats				
OSA-I (PTFG)	10	SSF	50 tons	825 tons
OSA-I (PTFG)	10	ESF	400 tons	825 tons
Submarines				
WHISKEY and ROMEO (SS)	14	SSF	0	1,625 tons
WHISKEY and ROMEO (SS)	6	ESF	200 tons	900 tons
Totals			1,665 tons	10,835 tons

Grand Total: 12,500 tons

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(U)(C) The PRC Navy has apparently chosen not to develop an underway replenishment capability nor to operate at great distances from mainland China; therefore, their capabilities in these areas are open to question. China's methods are typically not sophisticated, much of their naval equipment and ships are outmoded, and they are oriented towards a defensive naval strategy. However, regardless of these facts, the Chinese have a significant offensive potential under specific scenarios. The defensive nature of the Chinese naval force also permits Peking to be selective in its offensive operations, and like any "guerrilla force," it will only take the offensive under favorable conditions.

(U) In summary the PRC has at least a latent capability for POL replenishment of warships in support of naval operations and they could probably "get the job done" if employing even the most basic transport and operational methods.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY DISTRIBUTION

SNDL PART 1

SNDL NO.	POUCHING CODE	COMMAND
21A	K500	CINCPACFLT (4)*
	J500	CINCLANTFLT (8)*
	H500	CINCUSNAVEUR (2)*
22	J502	COMSECONDFLT*
	K660	COMTHIRDFLT*
	H511	COMSIXTHFLT
	K515	COMSEVENTHFLT
23A	K510	COMNAVFORJAPAN (2)
	K658	COMUSNAVPHIL
23B	H519	COMASWFORSIXTHFLT
	H506	COMIDEASTFOR*
	K661	COMATKCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFLT
	K662	COMPATFORSEVENTHFLT
24A	K525	COMNAVAIRPAC (10)
	J505	COMNAVAIRLANT
24D	K650	COMNAVSURFPAC
	J517	COMNAVSURFLANT
24G	J532	COMSUBLANT
	K668	COMSUBPAC
24J	J575	CGFMFLANT/CGFMFEUR (DESIGNATE)
	K605	CGFMFPAC
26B1	K655	COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT
26F	J593	COMOPTEVFOR (2)
2600	J594	COMFEWSG
26YY	H599	FOSIF ROTA (2)
	K645	FOSIF WESTPAC
26HHH	K679	FLTCORGRU-1*

SNDL PART 1 (Continued)

SNDL NO.	POUCHING CODE	COMMAND
28K1	J826	COMSUBGRU-2
	K896	COMSUBGRU-5*
	J828	COMSUBGRU-6
	K826	COMSUBGRU-7
	J829	COMSUBGRU-8
	K827	COMSUBRON-15
42A	J945	COMFAIRKEFLAVIK
42F	K410	COMMAT/VAQWINGPAC
42P1	J853	COMPATWINGSLANT
	K937	DET ADAK PATWING TWO
42X	K736	COMFAIRECONRON ONE (2)
	J657	COMFAIRECONRON TWO
45A2	K632	CG THIRD MAF
45B	K610	CGFIRSTMARDIV
	J818	CGSECONDMARDIV
46B	K601	CGFIRSTMAW
	J993	CGSECONDMAW
	K603	CGTHIRDMAW

SNDL PART 2

SNDL NO.	POUCHING CODE	ACTIVITY
A3	D011	CNO (15)*
A4A	D510	CHNAVMAT
A6	D150	CMC
B2	B344	DIA (98)
	P092	NSA (CS/CDB) (26)*
C4F9	D246	NAVSURFWPNCENLAB DAHLGREN

SNDL PART 2 (Continued)

SNDL NO.	POUCHING CODE	ACTIVITY
C4J	D911	NAVOCEANSURVINFOCEN (3)*
E3A	D218	NRL
FF1	D814	COMTWELVE
FA2	J515	FICEURLANT
FA23	D332	COMNAVFAC KEFLAVIK
FA24	J522	COMNAVBASE GTMO
FB1	K505	FICPAC
FB36	D319	COMNAVFAC ADAK
FE1	D505	COMNAVSECGRU
FKA6A2	D217	NAVWPNSCEN
FKA6A10	D263	NELC*
FKA6A11	D506	NAVUSEACEN
FKR4A	D153	PACMISRAN
FS3	D008	NISC (2)
FS5	DORA	NAVFLDOPINTO (DORA)*
FT73	D249	NAVPGSCOL
FT75	D202	NAVWARCOL

OTHER DISTRIBUTION

POUCHING CODE	COMMAND
E437	AFIS/INI (2)
D990	ASSTCOMNAVSECGRU*
CNA	CNA
A119	DEF SMAC
H501	DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
J516	DIRNAVSECGRULANT
K311	DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
C620	USASRD
	SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION (35)
	STOCK (11)

*RECEIVES MICROFICHE IN ADDITION TO HARD COPY

TOTAL 286COPIES